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Abstract 
 
Wearable devices have become more common for 
the average consumer. As devices need to operate 
with low power, many devices use simplified security 
measures to secure the data during transmission. 
While Bluetooth, the primary method of 
communication, includes certain security measures 
as part of the format, they are insufficient to fully 
secure the connection and the data transmitted. 
Users must be made aware of the potential security 
threats to the information communicated by the 
wearable, as well as be empowered and engaged to 
protect it. In this paper, we propose a method of 
identifying insecure environments through 
crowdsourced data, allowing wearable consumers to 
deploy an application on their base system (e.g., a 
smart phone) that alerts when in the presence of a 
security threat. We examine two different machine 
learning methods for classifying the environment and 
interacting with the users, as well as evaluating the 
potential uses for both algorithms.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been a marked increase in the demand 
for wearable devices by the average consumer, from 
fitness bands and blood pressure monitors to sweat 
sensors and headphones. These devices communicate 
through Bluetooth to a base station, often a phone, to 
transmit data. Their proliferation by a multitude of 
companies and the speed at which they are entering 
the market means that security mechanisms may be 
deferred to later product releases. The lack of security 
consideration means these devices and/or their 
connections are more likely to be attacked or have 
data stolen.  
The security of Bluetooth devices primarily relies 
on attackers being unable to follow the 
communication pattern. However, if an attacker can 
capture the initial pairing messages between a 
wearable and its base station, they may be able to 
follow the full hop pattern. The pairing packets also 
include the keys used to decrypt additional data 
packets, if the devices use encryption. Acquiring the 
keys allows hackers to intercept all data 
communication, assuming they can get the hop 
pattern. Ryan [12] was able to overcome this 
constraint, showing that the encryption that Bluetooth 
uses can be bypassed nearly instantly and that the hop 
pattern could be calculated with only minimal 
packets intercepted by chance.  
Consumers are largely unaware of security risks, 
widely adopting a somewhat childish “If I can’t see 
you, you can’t see me” approach to securing their 
information [6]. This inattention becomes a much 
larger problem when data is being transmitted via 
Bluetooth. Most Bluetooth devices use only the 
security measures already in the specification itself, 
such as the default encryption and the rapid change of 
communication frequency. However, there are 
mechanisms that can sniff Bluetooth packets and 
provide a method for man-in-the-middle and denial 
of service attacks. [12].  
Because wearables collect significant amounts of 
data, from accelerometer data to medical information 
such as heartrate, they can provide an attacker with 
very detailed information about the wearer. For 
instance, it has been shown that accelerometer data 
generated by hand movements as captured by a 
wearable (e.g., a smart bracelet or watch), could be 
intercepted by an attacker and potentially calculate a 
user’s PIN [16]. Because of the possibility of 
intercepting Bluetooth communication, it is 
increasingly important to have a method to prevent 
data leakage. Ideally, new security mechanisms 
should be compatible with existing Bluetooth 
devices, as well as become deployable on future 
devices. 
As there are large numbers of Bluetooth devices 
currently in the hands of consumers, with 3 billion 
being sold in 2014 [1], there exists the potential to 
use crowdsourcing techniques to collect obfuscated 
user data. This data can provide researchers with the 
ability to discover patterns based on wearable usage 
given the basic information that the devices already 
collect. When dealing with large datasets, machine 
learning is often used to discover patterns quickly 
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and effectively.  Utilizing such techniques could lead 
to a greater understanding of user environments and 
the ability to adapt to unexpected security concerns 
of new environments.  
We previously investigated methodologies to 
secure wearable connections by preventing data from 
being sent between devices when the devices are in 
an insecure location [15]. This research involved 
examining passive and active wearables and the 
different ways in which they submit data to the 
associated base station. Given the differences, we 
determined that the best overall method was to force 
the wearable to send empty packets. To illustrate the 
methodology, we deployed an iPhone app with 
embedded rules for pre-defined insecure 
environments, such as using the GPS coordinates of a 
university office. This allowed us to ensure that, in a 
potentially insecure environment, the app could 
automatically cause the wearable to send empty 
packets and not disconnect. The app deployed only 
static rules, whose modification had to be performed 
programmatically. While the manual construction 
and deployment of such rules was not meant for a 
wearable consumer, it did provide us with a means to 
communicate with the wearable using this form of 
technology. 
In this paper, we expand on the original concept 
of using an adaptive base station app, by exploring 
the use of a cloud service and two machine learning 
algorithms using data that is simulated as if 
crowdsourced from users. One algorithm generates a 
series of rules, allowing users to receive updated 
rules automatically to adapt the app, and 
consequently, their wearables, to recognize new, 
potentially insecure situations as they are identified. 
The second algorithm classifies ranges of sensors and 
their combinations as potentially insecure in real-time 
and can respond to an application’s query as to the 
probability of the wearable information being 
insecure. We detail the algorithms and their 
integration with an extended app. We then evaluate 
the benefits and disadvantages of each machine 
learning algorithm, including how often they are 
correct when given additional testing data. 
 
2. Background  
 
Existing Bluetooth security has been shown to be 
lacking in many key areas. Ryan [12] created a 
method to brute-force the key exchange protocol after 
intercepting the pairing packets. This allowed him to 
decrypt all additional communication sent between 
the devices, illustrating a need for additional security 
which relies on something beyond standard 
encryption. 
Diallo, et al. [4] attempted to secure the pairing 
process by creating a table of trusted MAC addresses 
for known devices which included a temporary 
private key to encrypt only the pairing process. 
Because this method requires both devices to keep 
their own table, device manufacturers would have to 
incorporate it into their design process. This method 
is effective at securing all communication, though it 
is unreasonable to expect manufacturers of Bluetooth 
devices to universally adopt this strategy. 
Two examples illustrate the need for wearable 
security awareness. Pan, et al. [11] were able to 
intercept and use data from a Bluetooth mouse to 
recreate passwords input through an onscreen 
keyboard. Wang, et al. [16] used the internal 
accelerometer on a smart bracelet to recreate PINs 
input at an ATM. Using Bluetooth keylogging and 
password recreation in this way makes it impossible 
to check if your information is being intercepted, 
implying the need for embedding technology that can 
stop wearable communications from being 
intercepted.  
Our previous work [15] investigated how this 
security might be added by forcing Bluetooth devices 
to send empty packets when in a pre-defined (static) 
environment known by the base station to possibly be 
insecure. This method relied on embedding static 
rules which could not be modified by the user. This 
investigation led us to the current research presented 
in this paper in which we design a more robust 
system by incorporating machine learning techniques 
and by crowdsourcing data collection.  
Machine learning algorithms have been shown to 
achieve accuracy with relatively small datasets. 
Moreno, et al. [10] were able to combine labels from 
crowdsourced data with an accuracy of 89% or above 
with datasets of only 500 labels and 200 users. This 
method would allow us to discover new clusters as 
they appear with relatively few reports of issues, 
which is important for any security application.  
Machine learning algorithms have been deployed 
directly on wearables and smartphones. Lane, et al. 
[8] examined four algorithms which used minimal 
processing power to not adversely affect battery life. 
They found that these algorithms were able to get 
good results, but not as good as more processing 
intensive algorithms which can be used when a 
device is connected to the internet.  
Parallelizing machine learning algorithms allows 
for more powerful algorithms to be used. Chen, et al. 
[3] showed that, when using a custom-designed 
architecture for running neural networks on parallel 
processors, they could achieve significant 
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improvements in energy requirements and speed. 
This method is ideal for a cloud-based service which 
can be run on multiple servers or across multiple 
processors more easily.  
Crowdsourcing and machine learning go hand in 
hand for many use cases. Because crowdsourcing can 
deliver large quantities of data quickly and machine 
learning can identify often unseen groupings in the 
data, it is natural to combine the two. For example, 
Minoda, et al. [9] used Amazon mTurk to collect 
preferred lighting levels of images within a room 
from a wide range of users of different ethnic 
backgrounds. Their study was able to determine 
estimated age and ethnicity of users based on their 
responses. As another example, Saxe, et al. [13] used 
code help forums, such as StackOverflow, to map 
terms found in malware to train a machine learning 
algorithm to detect the capabilities of specific 
malware program. They were able to determine if a 
specific piece of malware contained a given 
capability, with approximately a 20% false positive 
or false negative rate. 
Crowdsourcing can also be used to improve 
existing machine learning algorithms by identifying 
where errors were made. Georgescu, et al. [5] used an 
algorithm designed to identify important information 
from academic papers, such as the author, title, and 
abstract. They found that, despite the added process 
of humans checking their work, they were unable to 
get above 90% accuracy. This shows the need, when 
crowdsourcing data, to understand that humans can 
be flawed, which can lead to imperfections in the 
data over which the machine learning algorithms are 
applied.  
Two independent researcher groups investigated 
crowdsourcing users’ smart home preferences in an 
attempt to improve the experience for all users. 
Shahriar and Rahman [14] and Bourelos, et al. [2] 
looked at energy management by crowdsourcing heat 
sensors and environmental data to optimize heating 
and cooling and minimize electricity used in homes. 
Shahriar and Rahman used machine learning to 
discover optimal clusters. Bourelos, et al. used an 
algorithm that attempted to minimize each home’s 
electrical requirements without compromising the 
comfort of the users in the house. 
 
3. Adapting Communication with the 
Wearables  
 
Bluetooth devices communicate using the 
Adaptive Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum. This 
method makes it difficult to intercept messages from 
the devices, as the channel they are communicating 
on changes after every packet. Hence, many 
Bluetooth devices do not incorporate additional 
forms of security. However, if an attacker is able to 
follow the hop pattern, they can intercept all data sent 
between the two devices.  
When wearables pair with a base station, the 
initial pairing packets are unencrypted, as they must 
communicate with a device that has not received a 
public key. This allows an attacker to gain 
information stored in the pairing packets, such as the 
hop pattern. Since the main packets are encrypted, it 
is possible to obtain the key used to encrypt the keys 
of both devices.  Thus, an attacker can eavesdrop and 
insert packets into the connection.  
The issue is typically combatted by the devices 
remaining paired so they do not send out additional 
pairing packets. However, remaining paired does not 
completely inhibit an attacker who has already 
intercepted the initial pairing packets from 
eavesdropping or inserting malicious packets. Our 
experimental application forced a small set of 
wearables to send empty data packets to an iPhone 
when in environments that were pre-specified as 
being insecure [15]. By sending empty data packets, 
and subsequently halting all data requests made by 
the phone, the devices maintained the connection, 
disallowing an adversary to capture the pairing 
information or obtain any information from 
eavesdropping.  
The original adaptive behavior was triggered only 
when the device was in an environment that was 
identified as insecure. The conditions defining an 
insecure environment were predefined and statically 
placed within the app to demonstrate its viability in 
preventing an attacker from connecting to the device 
themselves or eavesdropping on the packet 
transmissions. The experimental application 
successfully prevented data from being sent between 
the iPhone and selected devices, which included a 
Metawear R, a Fitbit Charge HR, a Pebble Time 
Round, and a pair of LG Tone Ultra Bluetooth 
headphones. However, the application it was unable 
to adapt to new potential threats or insecure 
environments. These threats and environments had to 
be manually inserted, which is impractical for 
wearable consumers.  
Validating the concept led to investigating a 
system that would allow for adaptation “in-the-wild.” 
There are multiple methods by which this adaption 
could be accomplished. The simplest method is to 
allow users to define rules from within the 
application. This method relies on users being aware 
of the security issues in their everyday lives and, 
therefore, is likely not to be adopted. A more feasible 
approach is to automatically adapt to the potentially 
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changing environments that consumers may find 
themselves in. In this paper, we apply machine 
learning algorithms to snapshots that are 
crowdsourced from security conscious users in order 
to classify environments as being secure or insecure.  
 
4. Insecure Environment Snapshot 
Generation  
 
To improve on our experimental application, we 
focus on creating a system that can connect multiple 
user experiences and learn what made specific 
situations insecure. We incorporate a cloud service to 
aggregate user input and machine learning algorithms 
to predict if a situation is insecure or not.  
To simulate crowdsourcing and evaluate our 
learning algorithms, we create a service that 
generates snapshots of sensor values representing an 
insecure environment. The snapshots are passed to 
the learning algorithms to represent users telling 
other users that they believe the environment as 
described by their sensor values to be insecure. The 
concept is similar to WAZE, a community-based app 
for traffic and navigation, where users communicate 
to a cloud service regarding traffic delays and the 
alternative routes they are taking. Similarly, the 
snapshot generation allows the algorithms to learn 
sensor ranges and combinations potentially related to 
insecure situations that can then be communicated to 
other users. 
 
4.1. User defined snapshots 
 
The application normally generates snapshots in 5 
minute increments. The only exception to this timing 
is if a user explicitly tells the app that they feel their 
data may be insecure. At the time this action is taken, 
the app will generate a snapshot explaining that it is 
in an insecure environment, and will remain in this 
state until the user tells the app they are again in a 
secure environment.  
Each snapshot is labeled as pertaining to a secure 
or insecure environment at the time of generation. 
This information can be used to both train the model 
to improve its accuracy and evaluate the current 
model’s effectiveness. The snapshots are stored 
locally until the user is in a position where they can 
upload the snapshots to the cloud service. Users may 
choose to not send data when in an insecure 
environment, as well as to only send data when their 
device is connected to Wi-Fi to avoid using cellular 
data. The cloud service stores snapshots from all 
users who use the application. By crowdsourcing 
their data, we aim to acquire a large number of data 
points for each potentially insecure environment. 
Users are not burdened with defining rules to secure 
their devices. Additionally, users allow other security 
conscious users to help define insecure conditions 
and situations with just the press of a button.  
Figure 1: Sample Snapshot 
 
An example snapshot is depicted in Figure 1. 
Note the value for temperature, which is used when a 
Bluetooth device which provides that data is 
unavailable. We have limited our snapshots to only 
include data that can be taken from devices we have 
access to. However, it is simple to add additional 
variables to these parameters when new information 
becomes available. In the case of the above snapshot, 
the user has said that they are insecure in their current 
situation, so the application is sending all available 
data to attempt to learn the reason. 
This approach relies heavily on a user with an 
understanding of their Bluetooth device 
communication safety, which may not always be 
possible. We expect that a user of our application 
initially will be security conscious enough to be fairly 
accurate with their choice of secure/insecure 
environments. As more users are added, the existing 
rule base should help give those users an 
understanding of secure and insecure environments, 
allowing them to become more aware of their 
wearable data security in their everyday lives.   
By crowdsourcing, we are able to generate an 
extensive list of potentially insecure environments.  
To beat this system, an attacker could change 
locations in order to set up in an environment that 
may currently be considered secure. However, there 
are other conditions that an attacker relies on that can 
identify potential insecure environments, such as the 
presence of public WiFi. Thus, if an attacker was to 
relocate, application users eventually would begin 
reporting this new environment as insecure, making 
the move only a temporary solution for the attacker.  
 
4.2. Automatic generation 
 
To test our approach and to obtain sufficient 
initial data for the machine learning algorithms, we 
{ 
 "Devices": "Pebble", 
 "Heart Rate": "136.0", 
 "Time": "1377.0", 
 "Speed": "20.724903281615532", 
 "Latitude": "35.72388775811967", 
 "Longitude": "-95.94220940565249", 
 "Temperature": "4.9E-324", 
 "Insecure": "true" 
} 
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needed to create a snapshot generator that takes a set 
of basic insecure environments and generates a 
significant number of snapshots, both secure and 
insecure, with loosely clustered data points 
representing insecure environments.  
We defined insecure ranges for each variable. For 
the purposes of this test, these variables had 
consistent but somewhat arbitrary values. In a real 
world situation, these values would be very carefully 
controlled such that they mimic an actual known 
insecure environment. The algorithm generates a 
value for that variable. As some of the variables will 
not always be available to the device, such as 
temperature and heart rate, we only generate those 
values in approximately 30% of the snapshots.   
Next the algorithm checks if that value is within 
the insecure range we had previously defined. If so, 
the chance that the snapshot will be defined as 
insecure increases. To better simulate human 
interaction with the system, we include a base chance 
that each snapshot that is generated is insecure. This 
is a low value to allow for snapshots which have 
values within the predefined secure ranges to be more 
commonly defined as secure. The chance that a 
snapshot is insecure can be modified prior to 
generation as needed to better simulate real 
environments or to force much clearer clustering. 
For initial testing, automatic snapshot generation 
was necessary to ensure there were enough data 
points for evaluation in Section 6. Each algorithm 
was trained on identical datasets generated in this 
manner. However, automatic snapshot generation 
also presents the possibility of introducing known 
insecure situations by generating multiple copies of 
the same insecure environment. This possibility can 
lead to the rapid response of the system in the event 
of a sudden and clear insecure environment.  
As in the user generation of snapshots, each 
snapshot includes a value if the snapshot is within a 
secure environment.  
 
5. Machine Learning  
 
We investigated two different machine learning 
algorithms to provide situational awareness with 
respect to wearable data security. The first algorithm, 
a rule-based approach, generates a tree from which 
rules can be derived that dictate when the wearable 
should send only empty packets. These rules can be 
pushed to our application as periodic updates. This 
method allows users to decide when their 
applications are updated, an important consideration 
for a phone application with limited data or service. 
The second algorithm, a cloud-based approach, 
performs machine learning using the Microsoft Azure 
Machine Learning Studio. This method requires the 
application to be in constant communication with the 
server, since the application needs to send each 
snapshot to the service to determine if it is in a safe 
environment. We discuss in more detail the training 
and results of these two methods in Section 6. 
 
5.1. Rule-based Approach 
 
For the rule-based approach, we created a web 
service to collect data from multiple users into a 
single repository comprised of snapshots of the 
wearable sensors. These snapshots are used to train 
the machine learning algorithm towards identifying 
insecure environments. The web service also stores 
the resulting rules, which are sent to devices to adapt 
them to notify wearables when in an insecure setting. 
The architecture of this method is shown in Figure 2. 
We provide more of the programmatic details below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Rule-Based Architecture 
 
The web service was entirely written in-house in 
Python, relying on a single R script to perform 
statistical calculations on the data that has been saved 
to disk. Our mobile app generates snapshots via user 
input from presumably insecure environments, as 
well as in known secure environments, which are sent 
to the web service. The web service parses the 
request and converts the resulting data into a single 
CSV file to be used by the learning algorithm. This 
method potentially limits the number of simultaneous 
requests the service can currently accept, but the 
bottleneck can be reduced by incorporating a 
database which is periodically exported to a CSV file. 
Using a single CSV file reduces the application 
complexity as the file can be directly accessed by the 
machine learning algorithm.  
Once sufficient data has been collected, we train 
the model using the full CSV file.  After initial 
training, if there are minimal requests by users for 
updated rules or if there are not enough new 
snapshots being generated, the learning algorithm 
will suspend processing until a predefined threshold 
is reached so that it can properly retrain and not 
1406
  
introduce rules which may be temporary or may 
lower the effectiveness of important rules.   
When training the model, our web service calls an 
R script to execute the Random Forest learning 
algorithm given either the created CSV file or a CSV 
file with training snapshots as input. The program 
learns which label and range is able to predict an 
insecure environment within the snapshots and uses 
that to generate a conditional inference tree, or ctree 
[7], as output. A ctree is a two-class decision tree 
which partitions the data such that the leaf nodes of 
the tree are the probability that the branch is insecure 
and that each internal node describes the features of 
the snapshot. The tree is created using a genetic 
algorithm, set to terminate when the data can no 
longer be subdivided. This allows us to generate rules 
by simply reading the branches of the tree. For 
numeric values choosing the left branch will result in 
a rule which is less than or equal to that value, while 
taking the right branch results in a rule which is 
greater than the value. An example tree can be seen 
in Figure 3. Note in this tree, the node labeled by [2] 
is connected to a leaf node of probability .226. The 
rule generated by this can be seen in Figure 4. Figure 
5 shows the branch [3][4][6] converted to rules.  
The resulting ctree can be used to give a 
prediction of whether or not a given snapshot is 
insecure by following the tree nodes until a leaf node 
is encountered and then comparing the confidence 
values against a pre-specified threshold. If the values 
are greater than the threshold, the snapshot being 
checked is most likely insecure.  Otherwise the 
snapshot is considered secure. We test a variety of 
thresholds in Section 6. 
We chose to use a ctree because we wanted to 
create a set of rules to determine whether or not a 
user is insecure rather than to have a predictive model 
which would require input data to make an evaluation 
of whether or not the user is actually in an insecure 
situation. This approach was chosen to prevent users 
from needing to constantly poll a trained model to 
determine if their data is insecure. Ctrees are also 
more resistant to noise. Any data points that fall 
outside of the insecure clusters cannot affect the 
cluster so the rules do not change. The only way to 
break up a cluster is to have a significant number of 
safe points to be plotted inside of the cluster, which 
would cause the integrity of the cluster to come into 
question anyway. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Ctree format 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Sample XML Rule 
 
 
Figure 5: Combined Rules from Ctree 
 
A ctree is a not a traditional decision tree. It has 
all of the advantages and disadvantages of a 
traditional decision tree, but the features are selected 
using statistical inferences at each step to make a 
reasonable educated guess for the features it chooses, 
as opposed to the traditional algorithm which guesses 
which dimension to divide on at each level, then 
checks its accuracy and retries as needed. This speeds 
<Policy> 
    <Device id="All"> 
        <Rule> 
            <Type>Speed</Type> 
            <Op>GT</Op> 
            <Cond>and</Cond> 
            <value>10.3458</value> 
            <priority></priority> 
        </Rule> 
        <Rule> 
            <Type>Temperature</Type> 
            <Op>LE</Op> 
            <Cond>and</Cond> 
            <value>50</value> 
        </Rule> 
        <Rule> 
            <Type>HeartRate</Type> 
            <Op>GT</Op> 
            <value>140</value> 
            <priority>.234</priority> 
        </Rule> 
    </Device> 
</Policy> 
<Policy> 
    <Device id="All"> 
        <Rule> 
            <Type>Speed</Type> 
            <Op>LE</Op> 
            <value>10.3458</value> 
            <priority>.226</priority> 
        </Rule> 
    </Device> 
</Policy> 
[1] root 
|   [2] Speed <= 10.3458: 0.226 
|   [3] Speed > 10.3458 
|   |   [4] Temperature <= 50 
|   |   |   [5] Heart.Rate <= 140: 0.119 
|   |   |   [6] Heart.Rate > 140: 0.234 
|   |   [7] Temperature > 50: 0.191  
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up the training time, while retaining the same level of 
accuracy. 
Once the model has been trained and the tree has 
been created, the tree is iterated over using a 
traditional depth-first search algorithm. At each leaf 
node, we get a certainty from 0-1 for the decision 
present in that branch. If the certainty is high enough 
and the decision is 1, the path is translated to an 
intermediate language that we have designed for the 
purpose of representing a set of conditions which 
must all be true for a decision to be made. The lower 
bound of certainty is determined beforehand based on 
the risk we are willing to allow our users to take. This 
value can be adjusted by the user from within the app 
as needed. We look at optimal values from our initial 
tests in Section 6. 
The resulting language is then parsed according to 
the original XML rule schema specified in [15] that 
works within the existing app. An example of the 
algorithm output can be seen in Figure 3. Each line is 
parsed by the algorithm individually, then turned into 
a rule. In the case of the tree in Figure 3, this means 
creating a rule based around Speed first, then taking 
both branches. The left branch is a leaf node, which 
gives us the rule seen in Figure 4. The right branch 
leads to two temperature options, one of which has 
additional children. An example of one of these 
completed branches can be seen in Figure 5. 
After parsing, the rules are stored in a database on 
the web server. When a request is made to the 
service, the list of rules is returned to the requester. 
This allows users to get updated rules at their 
convenience. As previously stated, the tree and, thus, 
the rules are resistant to noise, so the integrity of the 
rules is preserved regardless of how long the user 
reports snapshots without receiving the latest update.  
 
5.2. Cloud-based Approach 
 
The previous approach required the app to be 
periodically updated to reflect potential insecure 
environments by pushing the rules to the app. An 
alternative approach is to poll a web service to 
determine if the current state is insecure. In this 
method, snapshots are sent to the Microsoft Azure 
cloud where the Machine Learning studio is used to 
deploy an algorithm to determine whether or not an 
environment is insecure. Because of the cloud nature 
of the algorithm, it can use snapshots that it receives 
to continue to learn new, potentially insecure 
environments constantly, adding and retraining on 
each new snapshot that it receives.  
The more simplistic architecture of this approach 
can be seen in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Cloud-based Architecture 
 
Using Azure ML studio, we trained a Decision 
Forest Regression model to evaluate a set of 
snapshots to determine how likely each snapshot is to 
be from an insecure environment.  The Decision 
Forest Regression algorithm was chosen because it is 
similar in function to the methods used in the rule-
based approach, is considered to have good accuracy, 
and is fairly fast to train. This is because the 
regression algorithm uses multiple decision trees, all 
trained concurrently, which results in a model that 
aggregates over all the trees to find a Gaussian 
distribution close to the distribution of all the trees 
taken individually. Ideally, these results could be 
taken from Azure ML Studio and converted into rules 
in much the same way as the rule-based approach.  
However, Azure ML Studio does not support the 
retrieval of the tree, preventing us from taking the 
results and converting them to a series of rules. Azure 
ML Studio makes it very simple to create a web 
service to handle individual requests for data to be 
scored, allowing us to use the system to evaluate 
snapshots as they are generated by a user. 
Azure ML Studio requires a CSV file for input, 
which allowed us to use the same file to train this 
model as was used in the rule-based approach. Unlike 
the rule-based approach, Azure ML Studio requires 
data to use for testing the model and requires the 
output of the algorithm to be in CSV format.  
The web service takes in a snapshot and reports 
whether or not the snapshot is insecure, with a 
certainty ranging from 0 to 1 which represents how 
likely the algorithm thinks the snapshot is insecure.  
To train the web service, we uploaded a training CSV 
file. This file is automatically parsed by Azure ML 
Studio into an internal format that Azure ML Studio 
uses. This data is then fed into a tuning module which 
takes the machine learning algorithm and trains a 
model. The resulting model is then deployed via 
another web service, as seen in Figure 7. This service 
takes the model and compares it with the input from 
the web, outputting the result to the requester. Azure 
ML Studio requires that a sample set of snapshots is 
included so that it knows the format the model is 
trained on, and this is included with snapshots2.csv.  
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Figure 7: Employing Web Services 
 
Similar to the rule-based approach, this model 
predicts if a snapshot given to it is insecure by 
checking if its confidence in that choice is above a 
specified threshold. We test a variety of thresholds in 
Section 6. 
 
6. Evaluation 
 
To evaluate our solution, we trained both machine 
learning approaches on the same set of one hundred 
thousand generated snapshots. The trained models 
were then tested against an additional one hundred 
thousand generated snapshots, and scored at different 
levels of confidence. To start, we trained each model 
on a base set of snapshots which had predefined 
clusters. These clusters were arbitrarily chosen, but 
would appear in a real life setting. The generated 
training set had a 10% chance that every snapshot 
would be insecure. For each snapshot that was within 
a cluster range, the chance was raised to at most 55%. 
We feel that this approximates the type of data we 
would get from an initial set of security conscious 
users.  
The results from this initial training set can be 
seen in Table 1a. Our test set, which consisted of an 
additional one hundred thousand snapshots, was then 
scored by both learning algorithms. In the rule-based 
approach, we checked how often the rules would 
trigger based on the confidence values we set as a 
threshold. We are able to achieve fairly stable results 
with confidences between 25% and 50% on both 
algorithms, though the rule-based approach provides 
slightly lower values for all confidences. This implies 
both learning algorithms are accurate. Note that, at 
0%, when all locations are considered insecure, the 
learning algorithm is still correct 38.8% of the time 
on both algorithms. This is because the scored data 
set had around 38.8% of the snapshots generated as 
being insecure.  
After the initial training set, we generated a new 
set of training and test data, each with one hundred 
thousand (100,000) snapshots, which introduced two 
new clusters into the data. The first based on location 
and the second based on temperature. The addition of 
these two new clusters raised the total percentage of 
the insecure environments to 48.9%. This simulated 
additional attackers appearing after the initial 
training, showing resilience in the training model and 
the ability of the system to learn new clusters as they 
arise.  
The results of this dataset can be seen in Table 1b. 
Again, we see the best results from confidences 
between 25% and 50%, and a lower accuracy from 
the rule-based approach. While both performed well 
at 50% confidence, the cloud-based service 
outperformed by 1.6-12.9%. This is most likely 
because of the choice of the decision forest 
regression as the training model, as this model is 
fairly accurate.  
Table 1. (a) Initial Training Set Results  
    (b) New Cluster Results 
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7. Conclusion and Future Work  
 
In this paper, we extended the functionality of 
previous research on our existing mobile application 
which prevents Bluetooth communication between a 
base station and a device in an insecure environment. 
We introduce a system that promotes the use of two 
machine learning algorithms, trained on simulated 
crowdsourced data, to predict if a user is in an 
insecure environment. We found that both machine 
learning algorithms were accurate, with the rule-
based method being accurate up to 80% and the 
cloud-based method being accurate up to 81.6%. 
Both options allow for increased security in 
potentially insecure environments.  
This method could be implemented by device 
manufacturers and application creators using 
preexisting machine learning packages and cloud 
services. Similar to WAVE’s need for modified street 
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maps, it would require modification only as new 
sensors were configured on wearables and how the 
data was formatted. The app creators could determine 
how often to retrain the models based on their 
security needs, which might provide a competitive 
advantage. The main limitation for a third-party app 
is whether device manufacturers are willing to allow 
developers access to what the wearable 
communicates, which could restrict how the device 
can be adapted.  
Future work will focus on both improving the 
machine learning algorithms and increasing the 
features which can be learned on. Additionally, we 
would like to begin testing our app with a small user 
base to see if our generated dataset is similar to the 
real world data that users would generate. Since our 
app relies on users to be aware of the locations and 
situations where they are actually insecure, we plan 
to analyze how often these users are correct. An 
important consideration may be to identify if there 
are other factors that can be assessed to automatically 
detect insecure environments that users are in and 
provide information on a more public scale. 
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